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Abstract Individuals with autism spectrum disorder
(ASD) have been proposed to show greater impairments in
implicit than explicit mentalizing. To test this proposition,
we developed two comparable naturalistic tasks for a per-
formance-based approximation of implicit and explicit
mentalizing in 28 individuals with ASD and 23 matched
typically developed (TD) participants. Although both tasks
were sensitive to the social impairments of individuals with
ASD, implicit mentalizing was not more dysfunctional than
explicit mentalizing. In TD participants, performance on the
tasks did not correlate with each other, whereas in individ-
uals with ASD they were highly correlated. These findings
suggest that implicit and explicit mentalizing processes are
separable in typical development. In contrast, in individuals
with ASD implicit and explicit mentalizing processes are
similarly impaired and closely linked suggesting a lack of
developmental specification of these processes in ASD.
Keywords Autism spectrum disorder  Cognition 
Mentalizing  Behavioral assessment  Implicit
Introduction
The attribution of mental states to oneself and to others,
also referred to as mentalizing, mental state attribution or
theory of mind, represents one of the most important tools
for successful social interaction (Premack and Woodruff
1978; Frith 1989).
Ever since the ‘mindblindness’ hypothesis has been put
forward, suggesting that individuals with autism spectrum
disorder (ASD) lack the ability to recognize another per-
son’s belief (Baron-Cohen et al. 1985, 1997), a large
number of studies have investigated explicit mentalizing
deficits in individuals with ASD using direct tasks that
prompt participants to infer others’ mental states. In those
direct mentalizing tasks, participants are asked to infer a
protagonist’s mental state from stories (Happe´ 1993, 1994;
Moran et al. 2011), photographs of persons’ eye regions
(Baron-Cohen et al. 2001), or from film scenes displaying
social interactions (Dziobek et al. 2006).
Recently, the focus of interest in social cognitive
research shifted from direct to indirect measures, i.e., to
measures, where the construct of interest is inferred indi-
rectly from another behavior (De Houwer and Moors
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2010). In contrast to direct measures, indirect tasks aim at
approximating implicit processes, which are more efficient
but also more inflexible than explicit processes (Apperly
and Butterfill 2009). Please note that in the remainder of
this article we refer to implicit and explicit for the
respective cognitive processes that are reflected in social
behavior, whereas we refer to indirect and direct for the
types of measures that approximate theses processes.
Studies using indirect tasks provide increasing evidence
for the notion that individuals with ASD show prominent
impairments in processing social cues implicitly, i.e., in
the absence of direct prompts (see Senju 2013 for a
review). For example, research studies using gaze tracking
report pronounced impairments of individuals with ASD
in implicit social cognition (e.g., Jones and Klin 2009;
Kirchner et al. 2011; Klin et al. 2009; Pitskel et al. 2011;
Kirchner et al. 2011). The social cognitive deficits of
individuals with ASD have been related to aberrant gaze
patterns when looking at emotional face stimuli (Klie-
mann et al. 2010) or naturalistic social scenes (Klin et al.
2002). Using an indirect mentalizing task derived from
game theory (the stag-hunt game), in which humans
interacted with a computerized agent, Yoshida et al.
(2010) found that the strategic behavior of individuals
with ASD in a social cooperative game was less guided by
implicit belief inference than in typically developed (TD)
individuals.
Importantly, paralleling the observations of a differen-
tiation between implicit and explicit mentalizing processes
(Apperly and Butterfill 2009), individuals with ASD seem
to show greater impairments in implicit as compared to
explicit social cognition (e.g., Senju 2013). For instance,
Kliemann et al. (2013) found that ASD participants showed
greater deficits in implicit than in explicit facial emotion
recognition, both assessed with comparable performance-
based tasks. With regards to mentalizing, high-functioning
individuals with ASD who did not show impairments on
direct mentalizing tasks, showed a reduced spontaneous,
i.e., implicit, capacity for belief inference (Schneider et al.
2013; Senju et al. 2009).
Up to now, however, it is largely unclear how implicit
and explicit mentalizing processes can be distinguished and
how they interact because previous studies either focused
on only one of these processes or did not use comparable
methodological formats that would allow unbiased com-
parisons (Frith and Frith 2012; Nosek et al. 2011). Fur-
thermore, the abovementioned indirect mentalizing tasks
only assess implicit processes in terms of how participants
respond to other minds and ignore how well they under-
stand those minds. The accuracy of such implicit processes,
however, is important, as the goal of everyday social
cognition is to draw accurate inferences to guide social
behavior (Zaki and Ochsner 2011).
A shortcoming of most mentalizing tasks (both direct
and indirect), concerns their abstract and mostly static
stimulus material (see e.g., Castelli et al. 2002; Saxe and
Kanwisher 2003). Abstract stimuli, such as written text or
drawings, differ crucially from real life multimodal
dynamic social cues that consist of visual and prosodic
information embedded into a specific context that con-
strains our interpretations (Zaki and Ochsner 2009). Due to
the lack of complexity, some static mentalizing tasks have
been reported to produce ceiling effects in adult popula-
tions (Baron-Cohen et al. 1997). In contrast, naturalistic
movie-based tasks may have the potential to produce the
required amount of variability in the performance of typi-
cally developed (TD) adults, making it possible to inves-
tigate individual differences in mentalizing. Since the
deficits of individuals with ASD are more pronounced in
unstructured real life social situations (Volkmar et al. 2004)
than in experimental settings, naturalistic video-based tasks
approximating real life scenarios are more sensitive in
picking up mentalizing deficits of individuals with ASD
than standard, static tasks (Dziobek et al. 2006).
To summarize, there is some evidence suggesting that
individuals with ASD show greater impairments in implicit
as compared to explicit mentalizing. This is in line with the
observation that individuals with ASD are characterized by
severe impairments in real life social settings (Volkmar
et al. 2004), where mentalizing most often occurs implic-
itly (Frith and Frith 2012). However, the interrelationships
between implicit and explicit mentalizing processes in
typical and atypical development remain unclear. This is
due to lack of comparable indirect and direct tasks and
because most standard mentalizing tasks to date are prone
to ceiling effects in adults (Baron-Cohen et al. 1997), thus
lacking sensitivity for a systematic comparison of implicit
and explicit mentalizing processes in adult populations.
In this study we aimed at systematically comparing
implicit and explicit mentalizing processes in TD individ-
uals and individuals with ASD. We thus designed a direct
and an indirect naturalistic movie-based task that allow the
tracking of accuracy and reaction times (RTs) and thereby
a comparison of intra- and interindividual performance
differences (see Kliemann et al. 2013 for a similar
approach). The tasks mainly differ in their answering for-
mat. After watching a social interaction, in the indirect
task, participants are asked to solve a film puzzle by
detecting the most likely continuation of the film scene out
of four different film clip options. Importantly, there is no
explicit prompt to infer mental states. In contrast, in the
direct task, the participants are asked to watch film clips
and select the most likely verbal explanation for the pro-
tagonists’ emotional states.
In line with the definition by Fazio and Olson (2003),
our indirect task approximates implicit processes by
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seeking to provide information about the construct of
interest without asking the participant to verbally report the
desired information (see also Kliemann et al. 2013). To
implement objective performance measures into the indi-
rect task, we chose a narrower conceptualization of implicit
processes compared to studies using indirect non-perfor-
mance based measures, such as gaze tracking. Our indirect
task involves the evaluation of multiple answer options in
the absence of cues that prompt participants to verbally
report the information of interest, and thus demand con-
scious processing. However, unconsciousness of the tested
psychological construct is not necessarily a criterion for an
implicit process (Fazio and Olson 2003; Nosek et al. 2011;
Vierkant 2012).
Here we investigated the new tasks’ sensitivity to atypical
social cognition as well as possible dissociations between
performance measured directly and indirectly. In line with
previous studies, we expected the mentalizing impairments
of individuals with ASD to be more pronounced in the
indirect than in the direct task. In order to investigate the
tasks’ validity and to further differentiate between mental-
izing measured directly and indirectly, we included two
widely established direct mentalizing measures, a perfor-
mance and a self-report measure. We expected individuals
with ASD to perform significantly lower than TD partici-
pants on both direct and indirect tasks. In accordance with
the notion that implicit and explicit mentalizing processes
are distinguishable, we expected the established direct
mentalizing measures to be more strongly related to direct
than to indirect task performance.
Methods
Participants
Twenty-eight adults with ASD (18 men, mean age = 33.1)
and 23 TD participants (17 men, mean age = 32.4) with no
reported history of psychiatric or neurological disorders
participated in the study. The ASD participants were
recruited through the autism outpatient clinic of the Cha-
rite´—Universita¨tsmedizin Berlin, Berlin, Germany, or
were referred by specialized clinicians. All participants
were diagnosed according to the DSM-IV criteria for As-
perger syndrome (N = 25) and autism without intellectual
disability (N = 3) (American Psychiatric Association
1994). Diagnosis was confirmed by at least one of two
instruments that are considered the gold standard for
diagnosing autism: the Autism Diagnostic Interview—
Revised (ADI-R; Lord et al. 1994), if parental informants
were available (N = 15), and the Autism Diagnostic
Observation Schedule (ADOS, Lord et al. 2002) (N = 25).
For 25 ASD participants, the diagnosis of Asperger syn-
drome or high-functioning autism was additionally con-
firmed with the Asperger Syndrome and High-Functioning
Autism Diagnostic Interview (ASDI, Gillberg et al. 2001).
The groups were matched according to gender, age, and
verbal IQ (see Table 1), as measured by the Mehrfachwahl-
Wortschatz-Test (MWT; Lehrl 1989), a German vocabu-
lary test. All of the participants gave written informed
consent prior to their participation and received payment
for participating. The study was approved by the ethics
committee of the German Society for Psychology (DGPs).
Materials
The Arena of Emotions Tasks
In this study we aimed at systematically comparing implicit
and explicit mentalizing processes with the newly devel-
oped Arena of Emotions indirect and direct tasks, respec-
tively. Both tasks approximate real-life settings more
closely than text or photo-based tasks, have a similar
structure and use similar material. The main difference
between the tasks is whether or not they contain prompts
that ask participants to verbally report the protagonists’
Table 1 Demographic and symptom characteristics
ASD (N = 28) TD (N = 23)
N M MD SD N M MD SD p Value
Sex, F(N)/N 10/28 – – – 6/23 – – – 0.552
Age 28 33.07 33 8.45 23 32.43 30 8.86 0.795
MWT-IQ 28 113 107 16.40 23 108 104 12.91 0.313
ADOS 25 10.56 10 3.34 – – – – –
ASDI 25 42.00 43 4.76 – – – – –
M means, MD median, SD standard deviations, and N sample size of group characteristics
ASD autism spectrum disorder, TD typical development, F female, MWT Mehrfachwahl-Wortschatz-Test, - not applicable, ADOS autism
diagnostic observation schedule, ASDI asperger syndrome and high functioning autism diagnostic interview
p values: two-tailed significance-value for t- and v2-tests in ASD vs. TD participants
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A: Example item for indirect task. B: Example item for direct task.
Each video item is preceded by a short written 
introduction, describing the context and setting of 
the interaction 
Each video item is preceded by a short written 
introduction, describing the context and setting of 
the interaction  
Written Introduction: Julia and Tim have been a 
couple for three years. They are very happy and 
respectful with each other. It is Tim’s birthday 
today and together with a friend he is waiting for 
Julia. 
Written Introduction: Dinah’s friends are helping 
her to move out today. They do not know that she 
has to pay a fine if she is not done by noon. The 
three friends are in Dinah’s apartment. 
Film clip content: Tim’s friend asks whether he 
has bought himself the new computer game he 
wanted. Tim replies that he did not. He states that 
he is sure Julia has bought him the game for his 
birthday. Julia comes in with a present. Tim 
opens it excitedly and discovers that she got him 
a pullover.  
Film clip content: Dinah’s friends take their time 
chatting about a vacation. Dinah urges them 
impatiently to stop talking and to start working 
instead. 
Task: Participants are asked to watch the 4 film 
clips and pick the best-suited option as to how the 
scene might continue.  
Task: Participants are asked to pick one out of 
four text options that correctly describe what 
Dinah’s friends are feeling at the moment when 
the film clip stops. 
Correct answer: Option 2; Tim’s facial 
expression initially shows disappointment. Then, 
he smiles and thanks Julia for the gift. 
Correct answer: Option 3; “Thomas and Anita 
are irritated about Dinah’s pushy behavior.”
Fig. 1 The arena of emotions tasks. a Example item for indirect task. b Example item for direct task
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mental states. The direct task contains explicit cues that
prompt participants to select one of four possible mental state
labels, whereas the indirect task involves the conscious eval-
uation of multiple answer options in the absence of explicit,
verbal cues. Given that most social behavior lies on a con-
tinuum between implicit and explicit, cognitively controlled
processing (Cunningham and Zelazo 2007; Cunningham et al.
2007), implicit mentalizing assessed with the indirect task in
this study can be regarded as more implicit than the behavior
assessed with the direct task, which includes the conscious
evaluation of direct cues that prompt participants to label
mental states including the respective rationales.
The items of both tasks consist of short film clips (mean
duration 21.6 s, SD = 5.2, range 9–31 s) depicting every-
day social interactions (e.g., colleagues taking a lunch
break or friends discussing holiday plans), preceded by a
short written introduction that describes the context (e.g.,
the relationship between the protagonists) and the setting of
the interaction (e.g., the interaction takes place at work
during a lunch break). We used independent film sets with
similar content, design and the same actors for both the
direct and the indirect task. The tasks were designed in
cooperation with a digital agency (gosub communications
gmbh, http://www.gosub.de/) to make them graphically
appealing. The tasks were furthermore programmed as web
applications to increase their accessibility because no
stand-alone installation is required, and to facilitate their
modification and distribution. The web-based assessment
further ensures that all generated output is stored in a
central database, which allows users to accumulate and
organize large data sets. The tasks can be accessed on a
public webserver through any browser with the Flash
Player plugin installed. The indirect task took approxi-
mately 14 min and the direct task 20 min to complete.
Although no time limits are set for the completion of either
task, the participants are instructed at the beginning of each
task to perform as quickly and accurately as possible.
In the 24-item indirect task, participants first watch a
film scene and subsequently four short film clips (4 s)
displaying different options for how the scene might con-
tinue. The participants then have to use the computer
mouse to select the film clip that represents the most likely
continuation and to place it into the target panel using a
drag-and-drop function (see Fig. 1). Thus, the indirect task
instruction is to simply solve a film puzzle with no explicit
information about the protagonists’ emotional or mental
states. The RTs in this task represent the time to watch the
four different video options and drag-and-drop the selected
video option into the target field.
In the 25-item direct task, participants also first watch a
film scene. In contrast to the indirect task, the direct task
contains cues that explicitly direct the participants to infer
others’ mental states (e.g., How do Thomas and Anita
feel?). That is, after having watched the initial film clip,
participants are asked to select one of four text options that
gives the best explanation for a protagonist’s emotional
state at the moment the film stops. RTs in the direct task are
tracked from the time when the response options appear on
the screen until the participants respond by making a
selection via mouse click. Due to differences in task format
RTs differ systematically between the indirect task and the
direct task (paired t test on RTs over all participants: t (1,
50) = 14.112, p \ 0.001).
Since mentalizing errors can either reflect insufficient
mental state inferences (‘‘under-mentalizing’’) or the ten-
dency to over interpret mental states (‘‘over-mentalizing’’)
(see Frith 2004; Sharp and Venta 2012), we have designed
our distractor items accordingly of both direct and indirect
tasks. Distractors were designed to represent three types of
errors: (A) mental state inferences that are ‘‘too excessive’
(i.e. ‘‘overmentralizing’’), e.g., interpreting a mistake as
intentional rather than accidental; (B) mental state infer-
ences that are ‘‘insufficient’’ (i.e. ‘‘undermentalizing’’),
e.g., underestimating the consequences of disrespectful
behavior; and (C) non-mental state inferences, i.e., the
inferences are not directly related to the mental states of the
protagonists in the previous interaction (for a similar
approach, see Dziobek et al. 2006).
To ensure that both tasks are comparable with regards to
the overall item difficulty and distribution, they were
Fig. 2 Accuracy scores of the direct and indirect tasks. Mean
accuracy scores in the Arena of Emotions tasks in Controls and ASD.
Accuracy scores in the indirect and direct Arena of Emotions tasks
differ significantly between groups. Asterisk significant difference
between controls and ASD (p \ 0.05); ASD autism spectrum disorder
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piloted in a separate validation study with an additional
sample of TD participants (N = 28). Based on the results
of the validation study, items that lacked sensitivity (i.e.,
produced ceiling or floor effects) were revised by changing
the introduction information and/or the answer options. A
detailed description of the stimulus production and vali-
dation processes is included in the supplementary material.
To assess the validity of the Arena of Emotions direct
and indirect tasks and further differentiate between the
assessed processes, we additionally included two estab-
lished direct mentalizing measures into the study. The
Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET, Baron-Cohen
et al. 2001) is a performance-based measure that requires
participants to label the mental state of a person based on
the information conveyed in photographs of that person’s
eyes. Thus, the RMET aims at inferring and explicitly
labeling mental states, similar to our direct task. We further
assessed participants’ awareness of their perspective-taking
ability using the ‘Perspective Taking’ (PT) subscale of the
‘Interpersonal Reactivity Index’ (IRI) (German translation,
Paulus 2006). The PT subscale consists of 7 items
answered on a 5-point Likert scale. The statements inclu-
ded in this scale, e.g. ‘‘I try to look at everybody’s side of a
disagreement before I make a decision’’, requires explicit
insights into one’s own perspective-taking abilities.
Procedure
The participants completed the Arena of Emotions direct and
indirect tasks online through the project’s website in testing
rooms under the supervision of trained experimenters. The
task order and the position of the four answer options in each
task were counterbalanced across participants to control for
possible order effects. Both direct and indirect tasks start
with a few introduction slides that describe the procedure.
Throughout the entire test, participants use the mouse only
to read the introduction or solve and proceed to the next
item.
The scores, e.g. accuracy scores and RTs for each test-
ing session are automatically saved to an online database
for each of the two tasks independently. The datasheets can
then be exported, downloaded, and further analyzed with a
statistical program such as SPSS (IBM SPSS Statistics,
Armonk, NY: IBM Corp.).
Furthermore, participants completed web-based versions
of the MWT, IRI, both accessible through the project’s
website, and the computer-based RMET, presented using
Presentation (Version 14.1, Neurobehavioral Systems Inc.,
Albany, CA).
Results
All variables of interest reported in the results section were
normally distributed and met criteria for parametric
analyses.
Reliability Analysis
Both the direct and indirect tasks yielded good internal
consistency (direct task: Cronbach’s a = 0.82; indirect
task: Cronbach’s a = 0.84).
Table 2 Social cognition measures in TD and ASD participants
Arena of emotion indirect task Arena of emotion direct task RMETa PT (IRI)
Accuracy cRT (s) Accuracy cRT (s) Accuracy Mean rating
TD (N = 23)
M 0.68 21.73 0.67 10.10 0.71 25.70
MD 0.71 21.43 0.68 9.62 0.72 25.00
SD 0.11 4.46 0.13 3.56 0.10 3.91
ASD (N = 28)
M 0.53 21.09 0.54 12.44 0.60 19.86
MD 0.54 19.97 0.60 9.31 0.64 20.00
SD 0.27 12.57 0.22 10.99 0.18 5.15
p value 0.010* 0.806 0.014* 0.296 0.011* 1025***
RMET reading the mind in the eyes test, PT perspective taking scale, ASD autism spectrum disorder, M means, MD median, SD standard
deviations, and N sample size
p values two-tailed significance-value for t-tests ASD versus controls; * significant difference between controls and ASD (p \ 0.05),
*** significant difference between ASD and controls (p \ 0.001)
a Number of ASD participants differs for the RMET: N(ASD) = 24
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Tasks’ Sensitivity to Atypical Emotion Recognition
Accuracy
We performed a repeated-measures ANOVA on accuracy
rates with the within-subject factor condition (direct versus
indirect task) and the between-subject factor group (TD
versus ASD). On both tasks, the ASD group had signifi-
cantly fewer correct responses compared with the TD
group (main effect of group, F (1, 49) = 7.410, p = 0.009,
gp
2 = 0.131; see Fig. 2). Participants’ accuracy rates did
not differ between the indirect and the direct task condi-
tions [no main effect of condition, F (1, 44) = 0.127,
p = 0.723; no interaction between group and condition,
F (1, 44) = 0.161, p = 0.69; see Table 2]. Furthermore,
the ASD group’s performance on both tasks was negatively
correlated with autism symptomatology at trend level
[ADOS and direct task: r = -0.387, p = 0.056, 95 % CI
(-0.826–0.010); ADOS and indirect task: r = -0.469,
p = 0.018, 95 % CI (-0.729–0.091); ASDI and direct
task: r = -0.379, p = 0.062, 95 % CI (-0.673–0.019);
ASDI and indirect task: r = -0.354, p = 0.083, 95 % CI
(-0.657–0.048)], indicating that more severely affected
individuals scored lower on both tasks.
Reaction Times
Mean RTs for correct responses were calculated for each
participant in both tasks and are referred to as RTs. Trials
with incorrect responses were excluded from further anal-
yses. There were no group differences in RTs for correctly
solved items in either of the tasks [direct task: t (1,
34) = -1.061, p = 0.296; indirect task: t (1, 35) = 0.248,
p = 0.806, see Table 2].
Gender Differences Within the ASD Group
Given recent evidence of gender differences in social cog-
nition in ASD (e.g., Sucksmith et al. 2013) and a relatively
large proportion of females in our sample, we analyzed
gender differences within the ASD group in an exploratory
fashion. As symptom severity and verbal IQ represent
potential confounds, we included these as covariates into
the analysis. Male and female ASD participants did not
differ with respect to symptom severity assessed with the
ADOS [t (1, 23) = -1.256, p = 0.222] and ASDI [t (1, 23)
= -0.897, p = 0.379]. They also scored similarly on the
verbal IQ measure [t (1,26) = -1.091, p = 0.285). To
investigate the tasks’ sensitivity to gender differences
within the ASD group, we performed a repeated-measures
ANOVA on accuracy rates with the within-subject factor
condition (direct versus indirect task) and the between-
subject factor gender (males versus females). ASD males
and females showed comparable performance on the direct
and indirect task [main effect of condition, F (1, 26) =
0.018, p = 0.894; interaction of gender and condition, F (1,
26) = 0.133, p = 0.718]. On both tasks, females had sig-
nificantly fewer correct responses than males [main effect
of group, F (1, 26) = 6.609, p = 0.016, gp
2 = 0.203].
When entering ADOS, ASD and verbal IQ scores as
covariates into the analysis, the group difference in per-
formance between males and females remained significant
[F (1, 17) = 4.581, p = 0.047, gp
2 = 0.212].
Correlation Analysis
We analyzed correlations separately for the two groups
because groups differed significantly in their performance
on all social cognition measures (see Table 2).
Fig. 3 Relationship between the accuracy scores of the indirect and
direct tasks. In the ASD group accuracy scores in the indirect and
direct task are significantly correlated, in controls they are not
correlated. The correlation coefficients differ significantly between
groups. ASD autism spectrum disorder
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The Relationship Between Direct and Indirect Task
Performance
The direct and indirect Arena of Emotions task accuracy
scores were not correlated in the TD group [r = 0.345,
p = 0.106, 95 % CI (-0.078–0.663)], but significantly
correlated in the ASD group [r = 0.829, p \ 0.01, 95 %
CI (0.660–0.918)]. The correlations differed significantly
between groups, reflecting differences in the relationship
between implicit and explicit mentalizing processes in
individuals with ASD and TD individuals (Fisher’s r-to-
z = 2.75, p \ 0.01, see Fig. 3).
The Tasks’ Relationship with External Measures
To investigate the tasks’ validity and further differentiate
between performance measured directly and indirectly, we
correlated both direct and indirect task accuracy scores with
scores from established direct social cognition measures,
such as the RMET and the PT subscale of the IRI, which
assess participants’ explicit judgment of their perspective
taking tendencies.
Among TD participants, Arena direct task performance
correlated significantly with accuracy on the RMET [r =
0.417, p = 0.048, 95 % CI (0.006–0.708)]. In contrast, the
correlation between accuracy scores on the indirect task and on
the RMET did not reach significance [r = 0.303, p = 0.160,
95 % CI (0.006–0.708)]. However, the difference between the
correlations was not significant [Williams’ T2: t (20) =
-0.493, p[ 0.05]. In the ASD group, accuracy scores on both
direct and indirect tasks was significantly correlated with
performance on the RMET [RMET and indirect task: r =
0.681, p\ 0.001, 95 % CI (0.413–0.841); RMET and direct
task: r = 0.791, p \0.001, 95 % CI (0.593–0.899)].
PT correlated negatively with indirect task accuracy
scores in the TD group (r = -0.421, p = 0.045, 95 %
CI (-0.710–0.010)], suggesting that participants with higher
accuracy scores on the indirect task reported explicit per-
spective-taking tendencies less frequently. In contrast, PT was
not significantly correlated with accuracy scores on the direct
task [r = 0.253, p = 0.245, 95 % CI (-0.178–0.602)]. The
difference between these correlations in the TD group was
significant [Williams’ T2: t (20) = -3.282, p \ 0.01]. In the
ASD group, PT did not correlate significantly with either
indirect task accuracy [r = 0.128, p = 0.517, 95 % CI
(-0.257–0.478)] or direct task accuracy scores [r = 0.280,
p = 0.149, 95 % CI (-0.104–0.591)].
Discussion
In the current study, we developed two naturalistic, compa-
rable tasks for a performance-based approximation of implicit
and explicit mentalizing with an indirect and direct task,
respectively. In TD participants, both tasks produced the
required amount of variability in performance, showing that
the naturalistic tasks are a sensitive means of assessing men-
talizing in a TD adult population. The tasks were also sensitive
to the social cognitive impairments of individuals with ASD.
ASD participants gave significantly less correct responses and
accuracy scores were negatively correlated with symptom
severity at a trend level, suggesting that more impaired indi-
viduals scored lower. Finally, the relationship between direct
and indirect task performance differed significantly between
groups. In the TD group, performance scores on the direct and
indirect tasks did not correlate, indicating that the underlying
processes are to some degree distinguishable. In the ASD
group, performance scores on the direct and indirect task were
highly intercorrelated, suggesting a lack of differentiation
between implicit and explicit processes.
Individuals with ASD are characterized by atypical social
cognition throughout development (e.g., Baron-Cohen 2001;
Baillargeon et al. 2010) and thus constitute a highly appro-
priate clinical population for studies on implicit and explicit
mentalizing processes, which have been proposed to differ-
entiate early on in TD individuals (Low and Perner 2012). As
expected and in line with a great body of literature (Happe´ and
Frith 1996; Hill and Frith 2003; Senju 2013), individuals with
ASD scored significantly lower on the direct and indirect task
than the TD comparison group, with more impaired individ-
uals scoring lower than less impaired individuals. In contrast
to our expectations, which were based on previous studies
(Senju et al. 2009; Callenmark et al. 2013), we did not find an
interaction between task and group, suggesting that individ-
uals with ASD were not more impaired in implicit than in
explicit mentalizing. Both previous studies showed that
individuals with ASD had impairments in implicit, sponta-
neously occurring mental state inferences, although they were
capable of explicit mentalizing. Importantly, however, the
direct and indirect tasks used in those studies varied widely in
format and were thus less comparable in differentiating
between implicit and explicit mentalizing processes. More
specifically, both studies used highly structured and static
direct tasks and unstructured, more dynamic indirect tasks.
For example, in the study by Senju et al. (2009) aberrant
implicit mentalizing processing was inferred from a lack of
visual attention anticipating where a protagonist in a film clip
would look for a hidden object. In contrast, the direct men-
talizing tasks used in this study assessed whether participants
were able to pass static false belief tasks. Given that the def-
icits of individuals with ASD are more pronounced in
unstructured dynamic settings (Volkmar et al. 2004), the
observed differences between implicit and explicit mentaliz-
ing could result from differences in the task formats. The
simple false belief tasks used Senju et al. (2009), such as the
Sally-Ann task by Baron-Cohen et al. (1985), have been
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shown to produce ceiling effects in participants with a mental
age above 6 years (Baron-Cohen et al. 1997) and therefore
may not have been sensitive enough to capture differences
between groups. With respect to the more advanced Strange
Stories test by Happe´ (1994), the authors used a small sub-
sample (8 stories) out of the total set of 24 stories. This could
have additionally led to a more restricted range in the per-
formance scores of ASD and control participants. In contrast,
explicit video-based tasks are less structured and thus provide
a more sensitive assessment of social cognitive impairments
in high-functioning individuals with ASD. Using a movie-
based task, Dziobek et al. (2006) found that individuals with
ASD were less accurate at answering explicit questions
referring to the actors’ mental states compared to TD controls.
Moreover, the movie-based task was more sensitive in picking
up mentalizing difficulties of individuals with ASD than static
tasks such as the Strange Stories test or the RMET. Altogether,
these results stress the importance of using more challenging,
naturalistic mentalizing tasks that produce the required
amount of variability to reliably assess implicit and explicit
mentalizing in both TD adults and in adult populations with
socio-cognitive impairments. Exploratory analyses of gender
differences in the autistic sample yielded significantly
higher performance on both direct and indirect tasks of male
ASD participants compared to females. Recently, a growing
number of studies have reported gender differences within
ASD on various behavioral measures including cognitive
abilities (Boelte et al. 2011; Lai et al. 2011; Lord et al.
1982) and social cognition in particular (Carter et al. 2007;
Golan et al. 2006, 2007; Sucksmith et al. 2013). In contrast
to our results, previous studies have found higher facial
emotion recognition performance in adult females with
ASD compared to males (Golan et al. 2006; Sucksmith et al.
2013). However, in line with our results, Carter et al. (2007)
found that parents reported higher social competences for
boys with ASD than for girls and Golan et al. (2007) report
higher performance on a naturalistic emotional prosody task
in autistic males compared to females. Thus, in more
complex naturalistic settings, such as inferring mental states
from speech and videos, or interacting in real life situations,
autistic males seem to have an advantage over females.
Given that males have a higher tendency to systemize
compared to females (Auyeung et al. 2012; Baron-Cohen
et al. 2003) a possible explanation for this gender difference
could be that autistic males benefit from higher systemizing
skills in complex naturalistic settings. More specifically,
males with ASD might use their systemizing skills to make
sense of social cues by e.g. applying social norms, rather
than processing them intuitively. Such strategies, however,
require social stimuli to be relatively complex and thus
might not be applicable to reduced static stimuli. In this
study, we did not assess participants’ potential task solving
strategies and also we did not assess systemizing tendencies
in our sample. To investigate this hypothesis, future studies
should include larger samples of males and females with
ASD and assess systemizing tendencies as well as perfor-
mance on a wide range of basic and more complex social
cognition measures.
With regards to the relationship between implicit and
explicit aspects of mentalizing, accuracy scores on the
direct and indirect tasks were not correlated in healthy
individuals. These findings are in line with previous
assumptions of a distinction between implicit and explicit
social cognition (Adolphs 2009; Apperly and Butterfill
2009; Low and Perner 2012; Kliemann et al. 2013). In
individuals with ASD, performance scores on the direct
and indirect task were significantly intercorrelated. The
correlations between indirect and direct task scores differed
significantly between groups indicating group differences
in the relationship between implicit and explicit mentaliz-
ing processes. However, TD individuals in our sample had
a more restricted performance range than the ASD partic-
ipants and this could at least partly explain the between
group difference in the strength of correlations. By
matching the groups for gender, age and verbal IQ, we
controlled for demographic differences between groups,
and thus believe that the greater variance in the perfor-
mance of ASD participants reflects a wider spectrum of
socio-cognitive abilities among individuals with ASD
compared to the TD population.
In typical development implicit mentalizing develops
during the first year of life (e.g., Kova´cs et al. 2010) and is
seen as a precursor to explicit mentalizing, i.e., giving the
correct reasoning for a person’s (false) belief (Clements
et al. 2000; Low and Perner 2012; Thoermer et al. 2012).
Young infants, for example, track the beliefs of others
(Kova´cs et al. 2010; Onishi and Baillargeon 2005) without
necessarily being able to make correct explicit belief
inferences (Ruffman et al. 2001). During adulthood,
implicit and explicit mentalizing processes seem to coexist
mediating distinct features of social cognition. For exam-
ple, Samson et al. (2010) reported that adults track another
person’s perspective, even when they are explicitly
instructed to focus on their own perspective.
Our assessment of the relationship between the partici-
pants’ performance on the newly designed tasks and
established direct social cognition measures provides fur-
ther evidence that implicit and explicit mentalizing pro-
cesses can be differentiated to a certain degree by
behavioral measures in TD individuals. The TD group’s
performance on the direct task correlated with the RMET
test scores, suggesting that both measures might assess
similar explicit processes. This result also provides an
external validation of our newly developed direct task. In
contrast, indirect task performance and RMET scores were
not significantly correlated. However, the correlations
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between RMET and direct task performance and RMET
and indirect task performance did not differ significantly
from each other. This indicates that implicit and explicit
processes, assessed with these newly developed tasks, are
distinguishable but not completely independent of each
other. In addition, TD participants’ subjective judgment of
their own perspective taking tendencies was negatively
correlated with performance on the indirect task, but not
with performance on the direct task. The significant dif-
ference between these correlations further indicates a dis-
tinction between the mentalizing processes assessed
directly and indirectly. The lack of a positive correlation
between direct task performance and the self-report per-
spective taking scale could be due to a discrepancy
between objective test measures and subjective judgments
of one’s own tendencies. Subjective self-report measures
are useful in detecting self-views but may not accurately
reflect socio-cognitive abilities. Such a discrepancy
between self-report and more objective performance tests
have been already shown in the domain of social cognition
(e.g., Brackett et al. 2006). The negative correlation
between indirect task performance and subjective judgment
of one’s own perspective taking tendency suggests that the
higher participants’ awareness of how they infer someone
else’s mental state, the lower they scored on the indirect
task. Our indirect task involves solving film puzzles. While
watching film clips depicting complex social interactions
participants infer protagonists’ mental states spontaneously
(Klin et al. 2002). Hence, individuals, who are less ana-
lytical and thus reflect less about their perspective-taking
strategies, could perform better on a task that requires them
to spontaneously track mental states while finding the
matching film sequence.
In contrast, individuals with ASD show severe
impairments in implicit social cognitive processes in
early development. Young infants with ASD do not
show a looking preference for humans as compared to
objects (e.g., Swettenham et al. 1998) and do not share
someone else’s attention to an object, i.e. joint attention
(Charman et al. 1997). Such implicit social cognitive
tendencies have been identified as precursors to explicit
knowledge about others’ mental states (Clements et al.
2000; Low and Perner 2012; Thoermer et al. 2012).
Impairments in implicit mentalizing processes, such as
joint attention, could thus lead to the observed impair-
ments and delays in explicit mentalizing. The link
between implicit and explicit mentalizing would thus
reflect common pervasive socio-cognitive impairments
underlying both implicit as well as explicit aspects of
social cognition. To address this notion, there is a need
for longitudinal investigations of implicit and explicit
mentalizing in individuals with ASD with comparable
performance based tasks.
In individuals with ASD, accuracy scores on the indirect
and direct tasks correlated significantly with performance
on the RMET and did not correlate with self-reported
perspective taking tendencies. These findings provide fur-
ther evidence of a lack of differentiation between implicit
and explicit mentalizing processes as well as a lack of
correspondence between subjective self-reported mental-
izing abilities and objectively measured mentalizing in
individuals with ASD, which is possibly due to a lack of
introspection into their social-cognitive deficits. For
instance, self-reported symptom severity does not ade-
quately differentiate autistic patients form other patient
groups (Ketelaars et al. 2008) and does not correlate with
scores on a standard diagnostic instrument, such as the
ADI-R (Bishop and Seltzer 2012).
Our findings seem to indicate that individuals with ASD
have comparable impairments in implicit and explicit men-
talizing and that therefore both processes deserve attention in
therapeutic and intervention settings, such as social compe-
tence trainings (Frith and Frith 2012). To date, existing social
competence trainings are mainly direct, training individuals to
label emotional facial expression or emotional prosody (e.g.,
Golan and Baron-Cohen 2006). These training interventions
mainly produce improvements on close generalization tasks
that are very similar to the training material, without general-
izing to other social-cognitive tasks or to everyday social
functioning (Golan and Baron-Cohen 2006; Hadwin et al.
1997). It is possible that effects of social trainings that include
indirect tasks and naturalistic stimuli that more closely
approximate the complexity and dynamics of real-life social
cues compared to tasks using abstract stimulus material could
generalize across a greater number of tasks and contexts.
In summary, we took a systematic approach towards
comparing mentalizing processes measured directly and
indirectly. To this end, we developed and carefully vali-
dated two comparable and sensitive tasks for a perfor-
mance-based approximation of implicit and explicit
mentalizing. Using these tasks, we showed that implicit
and explicit mentalizing are similarly impaired in indi-
viduals with ASD. Furthermore, assessing TD individuals
and individuals with ASD with the direct and indirect tasks,
we further specified the relationship between explicit and
implicit mentalizing processes in typical and atypical
development. Our results suggest that implicit and explicit
mentalizing processes seem to be distinct to a certain
degree in healthy individuals, whereas in individuals with
ASD implicit and explicit processes seem to be more clo-
sely linked. In conclusion, naturalistic tasks are a sensitive
means to address the pervasive mentalizing impairments of
individuals with ASD, which concern both explicit and
implicit mentalizing processes. Thus, there is a need to
include dynamic naturalistic tests into social cognitive test
batteries, trainings, and interventions.
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